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Abstract: Birch’s formulation is persuasive but not nuanced enough to capture at least one
situation where it is reasonable to invoke the precautionary principle (PP): when we have
multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically
significant evidence of a single credible indicator of sentience within the order as required by
BAR. I respond to the worry that if we include such cases in our framework for applying the PP,
we open ourselves to the charge of being “unscientific.”
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Birch (2017) presents us with a “first-pass” framework for applying the Precautionary Principle
(PP) to the question of animal sentience. I am broadly sympathetic to Birch’s approach but
worry that the emphasis on “statistically significant evidence” of at least one credible indicator
of sentience is too strong. It fails to take into account the type of evidence that we frequently
have available to us in the case of animal sentience research.
As noted by Birch, credible and meaningful application of the PP to the question of
animal sentience involves (among other things) balancing our concern for animal welfare with
our concern for having scientifically respectable welfare policy. For scientific credibility, Birch
leans heavily on “normal scientific standards”; for our concerns about risk of harm, he requires
one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of the order. Birch’s decision to
require statistically significant scientific evidence of just one credible indicator of sentience may
seem quite generous, but BAR is actually too strong for some situations where one might
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reasonably want to invoke the PP: cases where we have multiple, weak, but convergent, lines of
evidence that a species is sentient, but no statistically significant evidence of a single credible
indicator of sentience within the order.
Such a situation is not just a hypothetical possibility. Evidence for sentience in animals is
often weak because of the practical challenges of studying animal cognition, as well as the
opaque nature of sentience itself. In looking for signs of sentience in other species, our evidence
is frequently undermined by:
A reliance on small sample sizes: This is commonly the product of small, captive
populations or the challenges that temperament and life history can pose to the study of
wild individuals.
The use of highly enculturated or habituated subjects: This is typically a result of
reliance on small, frequently studied captive populations, but it can also be due to the
prior training of subjects that some tests for sentience require.
Reliance on anecdotal or observational report: Such reports are typically seen as lacking
scientific rigor. Despite this, we often have far more of this type of evidence than we
have from controlled laboratory studies (see Browning’s (2017) commentary on this
article for a more detailed discussion).
The phylogenetic distance between the target species and our own or other species
widely accepted to be sentient: This distance weakens the strength of inferences based
on homology and is most troublesome when we are dealing with non-mammalian
species. (The detailed recent discussion on sentience and the neurophysiology of fish in
this journal (Key 2016; Woodruff 2017) offers a good illustration of the challenge posed
by phylogenetic distance.)
The challenges posed by producing a species-specific behavioural test for sentience:
“Gold standard” tests such as the self-delivery of analgesics have physiological, cognitive
and behavioural requirements that need to be adjusted to suit the particular species in
question. Such adjustments are not always feasible.
It is always possible that the reason we have limited, poor-quality evidence for the sentience of
a species is that it is not actually sentient, but not all cases of limited or poor-quality evidence
are the same. There is a big difference between having (1) many lines of weak, but convergent,
positive evidence for sentience, and having (2) a little weak positive evidence along with many
lines of negative evidence, or (3) many lines of weak evidence in which there is no particular
trend for or against sentience. In (1) (but clearly not (2) and (3)), although we lack statistically
significant evidence, we do have some empirical justification for invoking something like the PP
on the grounds of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Indeed, this looks like exactly the
situation in which advocates of the PP would want to invoke the principle—to allow action
where we have good justification for thinking a species may be sentient, but not enough for
statistical significance on even one credible indicator of sentience.
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This proposed change to BAR does not necessarily put the scientific credibility of the PP
at risk. To invoke IBE across multiple lines of weak, but convergent, evidence is not to invite
insensitivity to evidence: it is to take seriously precisely the kind precaution against inaction in
the face of evidence for sentience that the PP was originally formulated to achieve. Moreover
(as Birch notes), far from being “unscientific,” IBE is a common form of reasoning in science.
Birch himself uses IBE in his formulation of the PP. All I add is the suggestion to extend the PP
across different credible indicators to include not only statistically significant evidence of
sentience, but also multiple, weak and convergent evidence. This is in line with the original
motivations behind the PP.
Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Heather Browning and Jessica Isserow for their thoughts on this.
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ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will
host a conference on Animal Consciousness.
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are nonhuman mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness
and vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in nonhuman animals?

Speakers and panelists include:
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland,
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts,
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney,
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter,
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy)

Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao.
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E
8th St).
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness
and ethics”.
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel
discussion.
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date.
Registration is free but required.

Register here.
See also the conference website.

